Wright State University

CORE Scholar
International Symposium on Aviation
Psychology - 2013

International Symposium on Aviation
Psychology

2013

Extending Mission Operations Safty Audits (MOSA) Research to
an Indian Sub Continent Island Airline
Sue Burdekin

Follow this and additional works at: https://corescholar.libraries.wright.edu/isap_2013
Part of the Other Psychiatry and Psychology Commons

Repository Citation
Burdekin, S. (2013). Extending Mission Operations Safty Audits (MOSA) Research to an Indian Sub
Continent Island Airline. 17th International Symposium on Aviation Psychology, 488-493.
https://corescholar.libraries.wright.edu/isap_2013/33

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the International Symposium on Aviation Psychology at
CORE Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in International Symposium on Aviation Psychology - 2013 by an
authorized administrator of CORE Scholar. For more information, please contact library-corescholar@wright.edu.

EXTENDING MISSION OPERATIONS SAFTY AUDITS (MOSA) RESEARCH TO AN
INDIAN SUB CONTINENT ISLAND AIRLINE
Sue Burdekin
University of New South Wales
Australian Defence Force Academy
Canberra, Australia
The aim of the Mission Operations Safety Audit (MOSA) research is to validate
behavioural self-reported data from professional pilots, so that management can
have confidence in this safety-critical debriefing information, and feed it back
into the training continuum. In doing so, a safety loop can be established in a
cost effective, operationally specific and timely program of data collection. The
first study was conducted in a military F/A-18 Hornet simulator. Pilots were
asked to self-report on their own operational performance across a predetermined
selection of behavioural categories designed in conjunction with subject matter
experts. To further test the MOSA methodology, this time in-flight, a second
study was carried out with the cooperation of a civil airline in Europe. Both the
military and the civil airline studies found that professional pilots were able to
effectively self-report on their own performance. However, the multi-crewed
European airline pilots’ results revealed that first officers were more critical of
their own performance. In order to determine whether national or organisational
culture influenced these results, the MOSA methodology was recently tested in a
regional airline operating Dash 8 aircraft between island destinations in the Indian
Ocean. The results indicated that neither national culture nor aircraft operating
culture appear to influence the accuracy of pilot self reports. However, the self
reports from first officers do appear to be linked to their seniority and experience
in that role.
The use of trained observers to rate professional pilots’ non-technical skills performance
during normal flight operations has become an accepted individual assessment and system
evaluation method in civil aviation. There are two well know approaches utilizing in-flight
observers: NOTECHS (non-technical skills) assessment and Line Operations Safety Audits
(LOSA). NOTECHS was developed from a Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA) sponsored
research project in the UK and Europe to provide a tool to assess pilots’ CRM skills in the
cockpit. These skills were defined as cognitive and social skills not directly concerned with
flight control, systems management and standard operating procedures (SOPs). As an
assessment tool supported by the regulator, failure to meet the predetermined standard can result
in license suspension and remedial training (Flin, O’Connor & Crichton, 2008). On the other
hand, LOSA was developed by The University of Texas Research Project and airline partners in
North America initially to audit pilots CRM performance and then expanded to identify threats to
the conduct of the flight and how errors are managed. It provides a report of an airlines
strengths and weaknesses determined by non jeopardy observations of line crew performance on
the flight deck (Klinect, Murray, Merritt & Helmreich, 2003). In-flight observations for both
NOTECHS and LOSA are conducted under ‘normal’ conditions. That is, during regular,
revenue raising operations.
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However, the definition of ‘normal operations’ in a military context translates into a
completely different paradigm. Normal military operations can involve high speed, rapid
manoeuvre, or terrain following radar flight in a range of multi-crewed and single pilot aircraft.
Many of these aircraft types can only accommodate the flight crew therefore, depending upon
the particular platform, in-flight observation may not be physically possible. Because of this, the
Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) supported research into testing the accuracy of pilot
behavioural self-reports, known as Mission Operations Safety Audits (MOSA). The objective
was to establish a valid means of collecting targeted safety critical debriefing information which
could be acted upon in a timely manner. Additionally, it was intended that MOSA could provide
a cost effective evaluation of aircrew performance which would highlight issues that could
feedback into the training continuum, thereby establishing a behavioural safety loop in line with
the defence aviation safety management system.
The first study was conducted using a single pilot F/A-18 Hornet flight simulator.
Participants were asked to rate their own behaviour on a 5 point Likert scale after ‘flying’ a
medium or high workload mission, according to pre-determined behavioural categories, which
had been designed with input from military subject matter experts (SMEs). These categories
included: workload management, communication, evaluation of plans, situational awareness,
monitoring and cross checking, inquiry, assertiveness and automation management. The results
across both conditions of workload were highly correlated with the ratings of expert observers
(Burdekin, 2012).
Following the military simulator research, Airbus supported a second MOSA study to test
self-report methodology on the flight deck during normal operations in a European multi-crewed
civil airline environment. SMEs from Airbus and the ‘low cost model’ airline Easyjet joined the
researcher to further develop the methodology to incorporate a crossed design which recorded
self reports from each pilot, along with the captains ratings for the first officer (F/O) and the
F/Os ratings for the captain. These ratings were then compared to the ratings from an observer
during the same flight sector. Sixty flight sectors were observed and the ratings by the observers
were found to be significantly correlated with the self-report ratings from both the captain and
the F/O. However, deeper analysis revealed that F/Os were more highly critical of, not only their
own performance, but also the performance of their captain (Burdekin, 2012). It was noted that
83% of the F/Os who volunteered for the study were relatively new recruits of less than one to
three years with the company and an average of 1950 hours total flight time. Given the current
debate concerning the minimum flight hours required by pilots to fly for an airline (US Congress,
2010; Rural Affairs and Transport References Committee, 2011), the MOSA research has
highlighted that junior F/Os expect higher standards of performance from themselves and their
senior crew members. In order to determine if the level of experience and/or perhaps a cultural
issue influenced the European civil airline study results a further test of the MOSA methodology
was conducted.
The present study was carried out in an Indian sub continent airline operating Dash 8
turbo-prop aircraft to island holiday destinations in the Maldives. The aim of the study was to
determine if the MOSA methodology would be suitable for collecting accurate aircrew selfreported information in a different cultural and operational environment.

489

Method
Forty one flight sectors were observed from the jump seat during normal revenue raising
operations by an experienced subject matter expert (SME) who is also a commercial pilot. All
crew members were volunteers and their participation was anonymous. As such, it was not
possible to determine if a pilot was observed more than once. The design of the study was
developed by the researcher with input from the safety manager, senior management and check
and training pilots. A crossed experimental design was developed where each volunteer crew
member rated his/her own performance, the performance of the other crew member and how,
collectively, they performed as a crew during each sector, across a predetermined set of
behavioural categories. The observer rated the performance of the captain, the first officer and
also how they performed as a crew during each sector using the same predetermined behavioural
categories. The protocols included eight categories of behaviour that were assessed to be a
representation of the non-technical skills that the airline was keen to evaluate. Those categories
were: briefing; contingency management; monitor/cross-check; workload management;
situational awareness; automation management; communication; and problem solving/decision
making. Each behavioural category was given comprehensive descriptors, illustrated in figure 1.
Figure 1.
Example of behavioural category and descriptors
BEHAVIOURAL
CATEGORY

DESCRIPTOR

GRADING/WORD PICTURE
(1. Poor; 2. Marginal; 3. Adequate; 4. Very Good; 5. Excellent)

Automation
management

Interaction
between the
operator and
automated
system

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

Incorrect crew interaction and management of aircraft
automatic systems. Clear errors of competency in
automation set-up, mode selection and utilization.
Basic interaction with aircraft automatic systems.
Appropriate mode selection and utilization barely adequate
to maintain safe flight profiles.
Level of automation interaction adequate to maintain
prescribed SOP profiles. Mode utilization satisfactory and
procedurally correct. Recovery technique from anomalies
reflects limited system awareness.
Automation interaction to a good standard. Effective and
timely management of automatic modes. Flight path SOP
profiles maintained to a proficient standard. Clear
understanding of aircraft automation systems reflected in
sound anomaly management.
Automation management to a high standard. Clear
anticipation and use of appropriate modes. All anomalies
managed to a highly proficient standard reflecting a deep
understanding of the automation system.

The protocol form allowed for crew members and the observer to comment on any issue
that affected the safety of that sector in the form of air traffic management, ground support,
aerodrome operations, cabin crew interaction, and any other issues.
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Additionally, a questionnaire was conducted during the flight that asked crews to identify
any wider safety issues of concern within the airline. For example: “Can you list the top 5
safety issues currently affecting the company”; “Can you predict what the next incident/accident
will be”; “What do you think would be the best way to prevent this from occurring”; “Can you
nominate one CRM strategy that you have adopted that has changed the way you approach your
flying”? The volunteer crew members were assured of individual confidentiality and the
researcher/observer remained the ‘gate keeper’ of all data.
Results
The data across all categories of behaviour were collapsed and subjected to a test of
correlation between the ratings of the independent observer, the captain, and the first officer
(refer to Table 1). In addition to rating the performance of themselves and each other, the crew
members were asked to rate how they performed together as a crew. These ratings were also
correlated with the ratings of the crew’s performance from the independent observer (refer to
Table 2). All results were found to be statistically significant except for the crew performance
ratings from the first officers. Details of crew experience can be found in Table 3.
The answers from the in-flight questionnaire were compared with routine safety data
gathered from flight data monitoring, voluntary and mandatory safety reports, air safety
occurrences, management safety committee meetings, and other workforce/organisational
evaluation data. Analysis of this sensitive safety critical information indicated that the results
were valid.
Table 1.
Results across all categories of behaviour
Rater
OBS
CAPT

Mean
4.12
4.15

sd
.54
.62

OBS
F/O

4.13
4.13

CAPT
F/O
F/O
CAPT

N

r
224

.669 **

.53
.58

224

.188 **

4.14
4.13

.68
.58

224

.232 **

4.31
4.15

.62
.62

224

.112 *

** Significant .01
* Significant .05
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Table 2.
Crew performance results
Rater
OBS/CREW
CAPT/CREW

Mean
4.25
4.26

sd
.52
.58

N

OBS/CREW
FO/CREW

4.25
4.29

.52
.59

224

.186 **

CAPT/CREW
FO/CREW

4.26
4.29

.58
.59

224

.099

224

r

.620 **

** Significant .01
* Significant .05
Table 3.
Average age and experience of Crew
Mean Age
Captain
First Officer

Average
Hours

46
31

Total

Flight
14,200
4,300

Conclusion
The results from this study show that both captains and first officers were able to
accurately report on their own performance, compared to the ratings from each other and an
independent observer, across a range of categories of behaviour which reflected their nontechnical skills. Although the observer/captain ratings were more highly correlated in both this
and the European studies, in the present study, the anomaly of first officers being more critical of
their own performance than the ratings issued to them by their captains and the observer was not
repeated. The difference in the self-assessment of these first officers might be explained by their
level of experience and the length of time that they had been employed as first officers. The
majority of the F/O volunteers in this study were senior first officers who were awaiting a
captaincy slot. Whereas, the first officers in the European study were relatively junior in terms
total flying hours and length of time with the company.
This finding suggests that the level of pilot experience influences first officers’ ability to
accurately identify their own individual performance, given a comprehensive non-technical skills
behavioural scale. Therefore, to be required by the company to regularly reflect on their
performance on the flight deck might help to facilitate first officer professional development.
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One reason for extending the MOSA research to the Indian Subcontinent was to test the
methodology in that culture. However, National culture does not appear to have influenced the
results as the observed behaviours were very similar to those from the European MOSA study.
The present study was conducted in a small airline operating turbo prop aircraft, flying short
sectors between island landing strips, although, this type of operational culture also does not
appear to have impacted the results.
This study lends support to the body of MOSA empirical research which concludes that
non-technical skills self-assessment information collected from professional pilots across a
predetermined range of behavioural categories is an accurate indication of performance on the
flight deck. Therefore, it is suggested that aggregated and structured aircrew self-reported
performance and safety information can be utilized with confidence by management to highlight
developing safety issues, and indicate areas of deficiency, as well as identifying the behaviours
that work well. Additionally, it has been identified that MOSA methodology can be used in
conjunction with other information gathering and evaluation tools to contribute to the on-going
safety feedback loop of an organisation’s safety management system.
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